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This paper examines the political economy of redistribution when voters have
asymmetric information about the redistributive preferences of politicians and the
latter cannot make credible policy commitments. The candidates in each party
are endogenously selected by a process of Nash Bargaining between the competing
factions. In equilibrium, there is “partial convergence” of redistributive policies,
support for “Director’s Law”, the possibility of “policy reversals” across the parties,
and “inter term tax variability” (political budget cycles) during the tenure of a
politician. The e¤ect of inequality on the magnitude of the redistributive activity
depends in important ways on the incentives and constraints facing politicians.
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The normative theory of redistribution characterizes optimal redistribution as the outcome
of a trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ciency that maximizes some well de…ned social welfare
function; see for example Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). On the other hand, positive theories
view redistribution as the outcome of some well de…ned political process. There are three
broad strands in the latter literature.
In the “direct voting models” exempli…ed in Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977), voters
vote directly over alternative income tax schedules to determine equilibrium redistribution.
Under certain conditions, the median voter makes the decisive policy choice, hence, changes
in the spatial location of the median voter are critical to an understanding of redistributive
policy. In the literature on “pork barrel politics” on the other hand, partisan redistributive
di¤erences among political parties, and their attempts to gain strategic electoral support,
determine the redistributive outcome; see for example Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993),
and Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1998). Strategic transfers, or pork, given to targeted
voter groups translates into greater electoral support. Since the rich and the poor have a
strong electoral and economic a¢nity with the Right and the Left party respectively, party
loyalties are most likely to be loosened for middle income voters, who consequently receive
the largest strategic transfers, an outcome often referred to as “Director’s Law”. In the
third strand in the literature, Roemer (1998, 1999) models the redistributive process as
the outcome of internal party struggle among the various factions within political parties.
Restricting attention to those policies which are not weakly Pareto preferred by any of
the factions, Roemer shows that equilibrium tax systems are progressive. Furthermore,
political parties might subdue their redistributive tendencies to seek support along other
(non-redistributive) policy dimensions.
Although it facilitates and develops a deeper understanding of the process of redis-
tribution, the existing literature limits itself to the joint assumptions of “full-information”
and “full-commitment”. These joint assumptions constitute a fairly strong restriction; its
relaxation is one of the central motivations of this paper.
The assertion that the ideological preferences of political candidates, especially prior
to their taking up o¢ce, is public information, does not seem to be supported in public
debates. Despite the role played by candidate selection processes in weeding out certain
kinds of candidates, most available evidence points to at least some degree of “residual
uncertainty” about the preferences/ ideology of politicians. In a special election report,
Patrick Wintour (The Guardian, 9 Feb. 2001) writes “Mr Blair claims his …rst administra-
tion has laid the ghosts of its own past. The party need no longer de…ne itself by proving
it is not the old Labour party. The next few weeks, he appears to be saying, as the second
term program unfolds will …nally reveal the Blairite government in its true colours”. Even
former Presidents can be fooled about the ideological preferences of the current incumbent.
For instance, President Jimmy Carter made the following widely reported comments (The
Guardian, 26 July 2001) about the current incumbent: “I thought he would be a moderate
leader, but he has been very strictly conforming to some of the more conservative mem-
bers of his administration”. Indeed, there is a general perception that politicians choose to
transmit (or hide) their true colors only through their implementation of actual policies.
1Politicians rarely, if ever, commit to a detailed blueprint of their redistributive policy,
prior to the elections. Campaign promises, in their interpretation as cheap-talk, might not
always be informative1. The retraction of President Bush from the Kyoto Accord is just
the latest in a series of instances where public perception based on campaign speeches is
proved to be wrong (The Economist, 7 April 2001). Columnist Ed Quillen (Denver Post,2 2
May 1990) pokes fun at the notoriously vague nature of redistributive campaign promises,
thus: “Read His Lips: ‘Know’ New Taxes”. Indeed Besley and Case (1995) provide indi-
rect evidence to support the assertion that mechanisms to achieve full-commitment, for
instance, reputational considerations or the ability of long-lived political parties to control
short-lived politicians are not always perfect.
This paper di¤ers from most of the existing literature in two further respects. First,
voters and politicians alike care about equality as in Dixit and Londregan (1998), however,
the existing literature assumes otherwise. Second, the candidate in each party is endoge-
nously selected in a model that re‡ects the spirit of Roemer (1998, 1999), namely, that
the selection of redistributive policy in a party is the outcome of internal party struggle
among competing factions.
The description of the model in this paper is as follows. All individuals are privately
informed about their redistributive ideology; politicians can signal their redistributive
ideology to voters via their tax policy. There are two political parties, the “Left” and the
“Right” and within each party there are two competing factions, the “opportunists” and
the “militants”; the former care relatively more about winning the elections while the latter
care relatively more about the party platform. The candidate in each party is selected as
the outcome of “Generalized Nash Bargaining” among the two factions; both parties choose
their candidates simultaneously. The chosen candidate in each party is privately informed
of her redistributive ideology, which can be either extreme or moderate; the latter type is
more popular with the voters.
The chosen candidates contest the …rst election, following which the winner implements
the …rst period redistributive policy. There is a second election at the end of the …rst pe-
riod and the winner implements second period redistributive policy. The game lasts two
periods, thus, the second period politician is a lame-duck2; since lame-duck politicians
have no future to worry about, they implement their most desired policies. Crucially how-
ever, …rst period redistributive policy can signal the politician’s redistributive type to the
voters (retrospective voting) who can then infer the redistributive type of the lame-duck
politician. Since the “moderate types” in each party are relatively more popular than the
1For cheap talk to be valuable, di¤erent types of candidates in an election must have di¤erent preferences
over the actions (voting) of the voters. However, since all politicians have idential preferences over that
action i.e. they would like voters to vote for them, campaign promises are unlikely to be informationally
valuable, see Crawford and Sobel (1982). This would, however, need to be quali…ed if long lived political
parties could control short lived politicians.
2This two period model embodies constitutional institutions such as “term limits” which are important
for gubernatorial and presidential elections in the United States. Term limits are also a feature of presi-
dential elections in South America (except for the Dominican Republic). Even in European parliamentary
democracies where term limits are absent, …nite lifetimes, institutional and social changes, and changes in
the nature of internal party struggles have constrained most postwar prime ministers to a relatively small
number of terms in o¢ce.
2“extreme types”, and political o¢ce confers ego-rents as well as an opportunity to imple-
ment a more desired policy, they must prevent the latter from hijacking their platforms.
In order to credibly signal their type, the moderate types need to appear even more mod-
erate than they actually are, to ensure that the resulting policy platform is prohibitively
expensive for the extreme types in their party, to hijack. However, if a moderate type
wins the second elections, then, as a lame-duck politician, she will implement her most
preferred tax rate.
The increased moderation of the moderate types creates “partial convergence” of the
redistributive platforms implemented by the two parties towards the middle. Middle in-
come voters then …nd the implemented redistributive policy to be closer to their preferred
outcome; this is a version of “Director’s Law”. Depending on the intensity of the extreme
type’s desire to misrepresent her type, it is possible that the moderate types in each party
move too far into the middle, and across each other, creating “policy reversals” between
the two parties. The distortion in the redistributive policy of the moderate type creates
“inter-term tax variability” (political budget cycles) over the two periods. The pattern of
these political budget cycles is party-speci…c and is in line with the empirical evidence in
Besley and Case (1995), namely, Left (resp. Right) party incumbents undertake relatively
smaller (resp. larger) redistribution in their …rst term as compared to the second.
The results on partial convergence and Director’s Law also arise under full-information
and full-commitment, however, they are driven by other considerations, such as the promise
of greater pork to voter-groups with greater “political clout”. The results on policy rever-
sals and on (inter-term) political budget cycles do not, however, have any close counterpart
in that literature. Comparative static results show that “ego rents”, the “political polar-
ization” in society, and “inter-party political polarization” are important determinants of
equilibrium redistribution. The predictions of these comparative static results are consis-
tent with the empirical …ndings of Shi and Svensson (2001).
Finally, most of the existing literature poses the relation between redistribution and the
extent of income inequality in a “median voter framework” (MVF) in which the median
voter directly chooses policy. This framework ignores important issues raised in a “rep-
resentative democracy framework” (RDF) in which the incentives and constraints facing
politicians determine actual policy. The results of the two frameworks coincide only in
very special cases; see for instance Cukierman and Speigel (2001).
In a MVF, Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) show that
inequality reduces the income of the median voter who consequently chooses greater redis-
tribution, however, the empirical evidence is mixed. However, not a great deal is known
about the e¤ect of inequality on redistribution in a RDF. This paper shows that inequality,
by altering the support bases of politicians, alters the incentives of the extreme type to
hijack the moderate type’s platform. It is shown that fairly simple conditions on the slope
of the population density, following an increase in inequality, can generate both positive
and negative e¤ects of inequality on the magnitude of the redistributive activity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model while Section 2.5
derives the properties of the probability of reelection. Sections 4 and 5 respectively char-
acterize the equilibrium under the benchmark case of full information and asymmetric
information. Section 5 also derives the comparative static results and discusses some ex-
3tensions. Section 6 examines the implications for redistribution when inequality increases,
in a RDF. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
The characteristics of all individuals are drawn from the space ¨=W ­ £, with generic







½< + is the interval of exogenous societal wealth (or income)
with distribution function F(w),a n d£=f±c;±lg represents the ideological type of an
individual such that ±c;±l 2 [0;1] and ±c <± l. Individuals of type ±l prefer greater
redistribution and are described as “liberals” while individuals of type ±c prefer lower
redistribution and are described as “conservatives”3. While w is public information, ± is
private information to the individual; the prior probability that ± = ±l is ½.T h e g a m e
lasts for two periods and in each period, the characteristics of any individual, (w;±),a r e
identical. There are two political parties, the Left and the Right; party members in each
party endogenously determine the respective party candidates, (wL;±j) and (wR;±k),s u c h
that wL <w R and ±j;±k 2 £.
De…nition 1 : Ideological polarization in society is de…ned as ¢± = f±l ¡ ±cg.
2.1. Redistributive Policy
In any of the two periods, the politician who holds o¢ce engages in balanced budget
redistribution using a linear progressive income tax T = f®;tg,w h e r e0 · t · 1 is the
constant marginal tax rate and ® ¸ 0 is the per capita lumpsum transfer received by
all individuals. The per capita taxes collected equal t
R
w wdF(w)=t¹,w h e r e¹ is mean
income, thus, the government budget constraint is given by ® = t¹.
2.2. Preferences










Individuals derive utility from their private consumption C(t;w)=[ 1¡ t]w + t¹ and
ego-rents Ãij (which entail no resource costs) that accrue only if that individual holds
o¢ce, in which case d equals unity, and zero otherwise. However, individuals derive disu-
tility if the actual magnitude of redistribution t¹, di¤ers from their desired level, ±j¹.T h e
parameter µ>0 is the relative weight placed by the individual on private consumption
relative to her ideological preferences. Using terminology introduced by Roemer (1998),
3It is more realistic to suppose, as in Dixit and Londregan (1998) that ideology might be correlated
with income or that ideology in the Left party di¤ers from that in the Right party. These extensions can
be accomodated, at the cost of greater complexity, but are not critical to the results.
4Figure 2.1: The Sequence of Moves
the parameter µ
¡1 represents the “salience” of the ideological issue with respect to redistri-
bution4. There is no discounting over the two periods and the intertemporal payo¤ of any
(wi;± j) individual, E [Wij], is additively separable in the expected payo¤s in each period:
E [Wij]=E [Vij]+E [Vij] (2.2)
where E, denotes the expectation operator with respect to the joint distribution of the
ideological type of the politician and the probability of her winning the election.
2.3. Timing
The sequence of moves is show in Figure 2.1. Nature moves …rst be choosing the character-
istics (w;±) of all individuals. The Left and the Right parties simultaneously select candi-
dates (wL;±j) and (wR;±k) respectively; these candidates are unchanged for the following
two periods5. The winner of the …rst election, the “…rst period incumbent”, implements
the …rst period redistributive tax, which voters use to infer the incumbent’s ideological
type. At the end of the …rst period, the …rst period incumbent contests her “second elec-
tion” against the opposition candidate. The winner of the second elections (the lame-duck
politician) implements second period redistributive tax policy.
2.4. Characteristics of the Most Preferred Tax Rate (MPTR)
In any period, the “most preferred tax rate” (MPTR) of a (wi;±j) individual, t¤
ij,i st h e









=0 ; the second
order condition is satis…ed because V
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ij = ±j +
µ(¹ ¡ wi)
¹2 (2.3)
4Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2001) suggest that because of di¤erences in social mobility, µ
¡1 is
relatively higher for Europeans as compared to Americans.
5If the opposition party were to reselect its candidates at the end of the …rst period, results do not
change, provided that the …rst period incumbent is allowed to contest the second elections.







ij ¸ 0,8(w;±) 2 ¨,but is not
vital for the results. The comparative static properties of the MPTR follow directly from
equation 2.3; these are summarized without proof in Result 1 below.
Result 1 : The MPTR is increasing in the individual’s ideological type, ±j (ceteris paribus,
“liberals“ prefer higher tax rates relative to “conservatives”), and decreasing in the indi-
vidual’s wealth, wi (richer voters prefer a lower redistributive tax rate). An increase in the
salience parameter µ
¡1 reduces the MPTR if ¹>w i but increases the MPTR if ¹<w i.
Recall that the Left and the Right party politicians are individuals with respective
characteristics (wL;±j) and (wR;± k):wL <w R. The following de…nition encapsulates the
spatial redistributive distance between the two parties.









Ll and since wL <w R,t h u s ,t¤
Rc <t ¤
Ll. Furthermore, if there is some minimum
degree of political polarization in the sense that wR¡wL ¸ µ
¡1¢±,t h e nt¤
Rl <t ¤
Lc.I nt h a t










The two extreme inequalities are critical; the middle inequality despite being plausible,
is less important. These inequalities show that the Liberal-Right and the Conservative-
Left politician prefer moderate redistribution relative to the Conservative-Right and the
Liberal-Left politicians; the following terminology is self evident.
De…nition 3 : Within their respective parties, the Liberal-Right and the Conservative-
Left politicians are the “moderate types” while the Conservative-Right and the Liberal-Left
politicians are the “extreme types”.
2.5. Voting
Denote the expected redistributive tax rates of the Left and the Right party politicians by
tr
Lj and tr
Rk respectively in the rth period, r =1 ;2. In the second election, a (wi;±j) voter






Rk)], while in the …rst








Rk)].I na n ye l e c t i o n ,
the winner is elected by a plurality rule. Suppose that in the rth election, a fraction x of the
total voters in the population prefer the Left party candidate to the Right party candidate.
Then, under plurality rule, the probability with which the Left party candidate (wL;±j)













and is independent of x6. It is straightforward to compute that
¦r
Lj = x and ¦r
Rk =1¡ x:
6Suppose that the utility function was Vij(tp)+°p,w h e r etp is the redistributive tax expected of party
p = L;R and °p is a party-speci…c parameter not related to the tax rate. Then, a (wi;±j) voter votes for
63. RE-ELECTION PROBABILITY: SECOND ELECTION
The probability of winning the …rst election is relevant only for the candidate selected by
each party, but not for the subsequent redistributive equilibrium, thus, its consideration
is postponed to subsections 4.1 and 5.5.1 below. Two remarks of a presentational nature
are in order. First, because, the game is symmetric, throughout the paper the …rst period
incumbent is assumed to belong to the Left party, on account of alphabetical precedence;
analogous results for a Right party incumbent are noted where appropriate. Second, it
simpli…es the analysis to assume that voters have asymmetric information about the Left
party incumbent and full information about her Right party challenger. Subsection 5.5.2
below relaxes this assumption; this only a¤ects the voters expectation of the tax rate from
the lame-duck Right party politician and does not a¤ect the main results.
Suppose that at the end of the …rst period, voters expect the (lame-duck) Left and the
Right party politicians to implement redistributive taxes t¤
Lj and t¤





















respectively denote a conser-
































Check that wc (t¤
Ll;t ¤




Rk) <w l (t¤
Lc;t ¤
Rk). L e m m a1b e l o w
shows that the wealth distribution can be partitioned into three intervals: “core support-
ers” of each party who vote for that party, irrespective of their ideology and “swing voters”
whose (privately known) ideology is decisive in their voting choice7.






prefer the Left party while all






<wprefer the Right party; these voters constitute the














, liberal voters vote
Left while conservative voters vote Right; these voters constitute the “swing support”.



































The expression for ¦2
Rk follows from ¦2
Rk =1¡ ¦2
Lj. Proposition 1 illustrates some
features of ¦2
Lj; analogous properties can be checked to hold for ¦2
Rk.







is increasing as: (1) the prior probability, ½,t h a tav o t e ri s
liberal, increases, (2) the Right party candidate becomes “less centrist” i.e. t¤
Rk decreases,
and (3) the Left party candidate becomes “more centrist” i.e. t¤
Lj decreases.
the Left party over the Right if Vij(tL)¡Vij(tR) ¸ °R ¡°L. De…ning ² = °R ¡°L gives the result in the
text. The term ² is identical to the “net looks-shock” term in Rogo¤ (1990) where it is also independent
of x and is interpreted as the ‘weather on election day’ by Roemer (1998), ‘voter-bias’ by Wittman (1983),
‘utility di¤erence in favour of the politician’ by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) and ‘intrinsic preference in
favour of the politician’ by Boadway and Keen (1999) .
7Unlike in the pork-barrel politics literature, the term “swing voters” does not imply that these voters
can be swayed by promises of pork (because of the absence of full-commitment). However, their privately
known ideology can swing the outcome of the election results, ex-post.
7Proposition 1 shows that candidates whose redistributive position is more centrist are
more likely to win and an increase in the proportion of “swing voters” who support the Left
party increases ¦2
Lj. The e¤ects of ideological polarization ¢± and the salience parameter
“µ
¡1” require further restrictions; subsection 5.3 looks at these a¤ects.
Under asymmetric information, the potential bene…ts to a politician of extreme type
from hijacking a moderate type’s platform are directly related to the resulting increase in
popularity among the voters; the following terminology is useful.
De…nition 4 :T h e“ di¤erential election probability” between the two types in the Left








To minimize notation and to emphasize that the …rst period incumbent belongs to the
Left party, write w(t¤
Lc;t ¤
Rk)=w(t¤
Lc). Using the de…nition of ¦2





L = ½fF (wl (t
¤
Lc)) ¡ F (wc (t
¤
Lc))g +( 1¡ ½)fF (wl (t
¤
Ll)) ¡ F (wc (t
¤
Ll))g (3.2)
The intuition runs as follows. For the moderate and the extreme types, the “core sup-













“swing support” lies in the intervals [wc (t¤
Lc);w l (t¤
Lc)] and [wc (t¤
Ll);w l (t¤
Ll)].S i n c et h er e -
election probability of any type equals the fraction of voters who prefer that type, thus, if a
moderate is replaced by an extreme type, a fraction ½fF (wl (t¤
Lc)) ¡ F (wc (t¤
Lc))g of voters
in the interval [wc (t¤
Lc);w l (t¤
Lc)] and another fraction (1 ¡ ½)fF (wl (t¤
Ll)) ¡ F (wc (t¤
Ll))g
of voters in the interval [wc (t¤
Ll);w l (t¤


















(x)dx > 0 (3.3)
The sign of equation 3.3 follows because F
0
(x) > 0, wl (t¤
Lc) >w c (t¤
Lc) and wl (t¤
Ll) >
wc (t¤
Ll). Thus, the moderate types, since they are “centrists” relative to the extreme types
in their party, are more likely to win elections. Analogously, if the …rst period incumbent
belongs to the Right party, write w(t¤
Lc;t ¤
Rk)=w(t¤





Rk))g. The di¤erential reelection

















(x)dx > 0 (3.4)
4. FULL INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose that political parties can credibly transmit all relevant information about their
candidate to the voters. Then, for any of the two elections, forward-looking voters correctly
anticipate the post-election redistributive tax policy and since no new information about
the incumbent arises on account of her tax policy, the result in Lemma 3 is obvious.
8Lemma 3 : Under full information, the election probability of any politician in any of the
two elections is identical i.e. ¦1
Lj =¦ 2
Lj =¦ Lj and ¦1
Rk =¦ 2
Rk =¦ Rk:
Voters know that the lame-duck politician will implement her MPTR; t¤
Lj if she belongs
to the Left party and t¤





Rk), which is independent of the …rst period redistributive
taxes. Thus, the optimization problem of the …rst period (Left party) incumbent is to














optimal solution is t1 = t¤
Lj. Hence, under full information any politician implements her
MPTR in both periods.
Despite ¢¦r
L > 0 and ¢¦r
R > 0, full information prevents the extreme type in each
party from misrepresenting her type. Under full information, there are no political budget
cycles over the terms of a politician, no convergence of party platforms, no policy reversals,
and no support for Director’s Law. These result will change when asymmetric information
is introduced in Section 5 below.
4.1. A Simple Model of Candidate Selection under full information
This section brie‡y sketches a simple model of candidate selection in the spirit of
Roemer (1998, 1999). Relative to asymmetric information about the politician, the model
of candidate selection is more elegant under full information mainly because (1) one can
abstract from issues of voters having to guess the subsequent “Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium”, and (2) the election probabilities in the two elections are identical (see Lemma 3).
For some candidate selection issues under asymmetric information, see subsection 5.5.1
below. Suppose that the Left and the Right parties stand respectively on some “initial”
redistributive platforms, tL and tR : tL <t R; these platforms arise from some (unmod-
eled) history of the game. Each of the two parties has a set of party members who are
exogenously given. The candidate selection process makes the following four assumptions:
[A1] Equilibrium Concept: Both parties simultaneously select their candidates given the
candidate chosen by the other party; the equilibrium concept is (Cournot) Nash equilibrium.
Since the game is symmetric, consider …rst the derivation of the Left party “reaction
function” tLj(tRk), which gives its desired redistributive tax rate for any redistributive tax
rate tRk chosen by the Right party. Using equation 2.3 any desired redistributive policy
c a nb em a p p e dt ot h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c s(wL;E[±]) of the desired party candidate, where
E [±]=½±l +( 1¡ ½)±c is the expected ideological position of any voter8.
[A2] Factions: Party members state if their MPTR t¤
ij ? tL. Denote the set of party
members who state t¤
ij >t L by M and the set of party members who state t¤
ij <t L by O.
It is obvious that party members in the set M prefer the “initial” party position tL
relative to the MPTR of any party member in the set O because tL is relatively closer to
their own MPTR. For this reason, they are termed as “militants”. On the other hand,
the MPTR of party members in O is relatively “centrist”, as compared to the “initial”
8The assumption that all individuals are willing to take up the responsibility of o¢ce if chosen to
represent their party is not overly restrictive. If taking up political o¢ce is costly and the pool of potential
candidates is limited, then the one closest to the party’s desired position is chosen.
9party position tL; and has a higher probability of being successful in the election (see
Proposition 1); hence they are termed as “opportunists”. In spirit, but not in the detail, the
terms militants and opportunists correspond to the usage of these term in Roemer (1998,
1999). In Roemer, the opportunists maximize the probability of winning the elections
by advocating more centrist positions, while the militants simply want to adhere to the
“initial” party position.
[A3] Bargaining Among Factions: The median (or representative) party members in
each of the groups M and O, bargain with each other, using Generalized Nash Bargaining,
to arrive at the consensus candidate for the party. If they fail to reach an agreement, then
the opposition candidate wins by default.
The utility functions of the respective faction members in the groups M and O are
E [WMj],a n dE [WOj]; the respective MPTR’s are t¤
M and t¤
O; the respective bargaining
powers are ¸M > 0 and ¸O > 0:¸O + ¸M =1 9; and the respective disagreement payo¤s
are dM and dO.
[A4] Technical Assumption: De…ne wc = ¹¡µ
¡1¹2 ftL ¡ ±cg and wl = ¹¡µ
¡1¹2 ftL ¡ ±lg.
The measure of party members in [wc;w l] is zero.
Using equation 2.3, it is publicly known that irrespective of ideological preference (1)
for all party members (wi;±j): wi <w c,t h eM P T Rt¤
ij >t L; and (2) for all party
members (wi;±j): wi >w l,t h eM P T Rt¤
ij <t L. Thus, the only credible announcement
by party members with wi <w c is to join the group M, while that for wi >w l is to join
group O. For all Party members (wi;±l) 2 [wc;w l], t¤
il >t L while for all party members
(wi;± c) 2 [wc;w l], t¤
ic <t L hence their (unknown) ideology is critical in their decision to
join a particular faction10. However, if the measure of these party members is zero, their
(possible) misrepresentation of type does not a¤ect the location of the median voters in
each of the two factions.
Under full information about the politicians and no intertemporal discounting, the
respective payo¤s of the median members in the factions M and O are E [WMj]=
2¦LjVMj(tLj)+(2¡¦Lj)VMj(tRk) and E [WOj]=2 ¦ LjVOj(tLj)+(2¡¦Lj)VOj(tRk);t h e s e
expressions use the result in Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 : In the bargaining game between the two factions in the Left party, the set of
feasible tax rates belongs to the interval T =[ t¤
O;t ¤
M]:
An analogous condition to the one stated in Lemma 4 holds for the Right party.
Hence a su¢cient condition for t¤
Rk <t ¤
Lj,o ra l t e r n a t i v e l ywL <w R (using Result 1)
9Roemer (1998, 1999) provides a brief historical sketch of the evolution of this bargaining power.
For instance the New British Labour party is often distinguished from the Old Labour Party in terms
of a decrease in the bargaining power of the Militants relative to the Opportunists. Evidence suggests
that the source of this bargaining power lies in the degree of enfranchisement, voter turnout, costs of
political participation, changes in partisanship among voters, social mobility, and changes in political
communication and campaign technologies; see for example Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), Müller (1999)
and Epstein (1980).
10Strategic considerations can induce party members in [wc;w l] to misrepresent their type if by doing so
the redistributive position chosen by the party is closer to their MPTR. The current model is not suited
to these considerations because the bargaining power of the two factions is not determined endogenously.
10is that the median member of the opportunist faction in the Left party prefer a higher
redistributive tax rate relative to his counterpart in the Right party.
Given assumption A3, the disagreement payo¤s dm and dO are found by setting ¦Lj =0
in the objective functions; thus dM =2 VMj(tRk) and dO =2 VOj(tRk). The Generalized
Nash Bargaining solution for tLj(tRk) solves the following optimization problem:
tLj 2 argmax¤ = (E [WOj] ¡ dO)
¸O (E [WMj] ¡ dM)
¸M
subject to : tLj 2 T



















The three terms in 4.1 show the costs and bene…ts of choosing a less centrist (higher
tLj) position. The …rst term is negative (¦
0
Lj < 0 from Proposition 1); a less centrist
candidate is less likely to be elected, which is costly to both factions. The second term is
positive (V
0
Mj(tLj) > 0 when tLj 2 T); the militants bene…t by putting up a less centrist
candidate whose MPTR is closer to theirs. The third term is negative (V
0
Oj(tLj) < 0 when
tLj 2 T); the MPTR of a less centrist candidate is farther away from the one preferred
by the opportunists. The net e¤ect of the second and the third terms crucially depends
on the relative bargaining power of the two factions. The comparative static results are
stated in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 : For any tRk, the “desired” redistributive position chosen by the Left
party is relatively centrist (tLj lower) if ¸O increases. In general, the e¤ect of tRk on tLj
is ambiguous but as ¸O ¡! 1, the Left party reciprocates the choice of a more centrist
Right party candidate by choosing a more centrist Left party candidate.
Proposition 2 shows that an increase in ¸O empowers the opportunists to press for
a more centrist redistributive position (lower t¤
Lj) that is more electable. If the Right party
…elds a more centrist candidate (higher t¤
Rk), there are two countervailing e¤ects. First,
since the Right party candidate is now closer to the middle of the political spectrum, ¦Lj
falls (see Proposition 1) which hurts both factions. Second, choosing a more centrist Left
party candidate in response would bene…t the opportunists (as V
0
Oj(tLj) < 0) but harm
the militants (as V
0
Mj(tLj) > 0). Hence, the net e¤ect is ambiguous but when ¸O ¡! 1 the
militants can do little to prevent a more electable Left party candidate from being …elded;
in that case, tLj(tRk) is downward sloping.
An interesting anecdotal illustration of Proposition 2 is the history of the British Labour
party. In the three decades prior to the election of Tony Blair as prime minister, purists
(militants) in the Labour party were extremely powerful (¸M high) and the party lost elec-
tion after election without compromising on its ideological convictions. However, following
the decade of the 1980’s there was a change in the membership of the labour party and
a change in its institutional setup that signi…cantly increased the bargaining power of the
opportunists and allowed Blair to be elected on fairly centrist policies11.
11There was a relative shift in the membership of the Labour party from Trade Union activists (militants)
11Figure 4.1: Candidate Selection Equilibrium
The reaction function for the Right party tRk(tLj) can be derived analogously. In
general, there is no presumption that the Nash equilibrium is unique, however Figure 4.1
shows the reaction functions for each party tRk(tLj) and tLj(tRk) in the case of a unique
equilibrium outcome. These reaction functions are drawn for two possible values of the
bargaining power of the opportunists in each party; a lower value i.e. ¸O and a higher
value i.e. ¸O + ´,w h e r e´>0. The intersection points ‘3’ and ‘4’ represent equilibria
when the bargaining power of the opportunists in each party is low and high respectively
while intersection points ‘1’ and ‘2’ illustrate two intermediate cases.
5. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM
This section characterizes the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria when voters have asym-
metric information about the politician’s ideological type. Attention is restricted to pure
strategies alone, hence, hybrid equilibria are ruled out. By placing an appropriate upper
bound on political rents, all pooling equilibria can be ruled out. Thus, the focus will
be on the separating equilibria; by ruling out dominated strategies a unique separating
equilibrium can be characterized.
Focus initially on the second election. In forming inferences about the ideological type
of the …rst period incumbent, voters update their beliefs, conditional on the observed
…rst period tax policy, t. Common posterior beliefs are: ! = Pr(Typeis±c j t) and
1¡! = Pr(Typeis±l j t). In a “separating equilibrium”, t1
Lj fully reveals the ideological
type of the incumbent, while in a pooling equilibrium, it carries no information content.
to middle class white collar workers (opportunists). Institutional changes initiated by Neil Kinnock and
John Smith in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s further weakened the power of the militants in the selection
of the party candidate. For a book length treatment of these issues see Driver and Martell (1998).
125.1. Separating Equilibrium
The game following the selection of the …rst period (Left party) incumbent is as follows.
The set of players comprises of the incumbent whose characteristics are (wL;±j),w h e r e
±j 2 £ is private information, and the voters whose characteristics are drawn from ¨=
W ­£.T h ea c t i o ns e to ft h ev o t e r sº = f0;1g denotes a binary voting choice; 1 denotes a
vote ‘for’ and 0 denotes a vote ‘against’ the incumbent in the second election. The action
set of the politician is a choice of the tax rate in the interval [0;1]. Any voter’s strategy is
de…ned by the mapping [0;1] !f 0;1g i.e. a voting choice for all possible announcements
of the tax rate by the politician. The strategy of the politician is de…ned by the mapping
£ ! [0;1] i.e. a choice of the tax rate for each of the two possible types. The single period
and the intertemporal payo¤s are given in 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.
Let the set of possible tax rates implemented by a moderate incumbent, (wL;±c),i n
a separating equilibrium be denoted by SLc, with generic element t1
Lj.T h u s ( c o n s i s t e n t
with Bayes rule), for any t1
Lj 2 SL, the following posterior beliefs can support a separating
equilibrium: ! =P r
¡
± = ±c j t1
Lj 2 SL
¢
=1and zero otherwise. The set SLc must satisfy























Condition C1 is similar to a participation constraint; it ensures the future gain to
t h em o d e r a t et y p ef r o ms e p a r a t i o n( L H So fC1), exceeds the current loss (RHS of C1).
Condition C2 is similar to an incentive compatibility constraint; it ensures that the current
cost to the extreme type from misrepresenting her type (RHS of C2) exceeds the future
g a i n( L H So fC2). D e n o t eb yS1 and S2 respectively, the set of tax rates that satisfy
conditions C1 and C2,a n dl e tSC
2 denote the complement of S2. The set of feasible
separating tax rates SLc = S1 \S2. Lemma 5 below records a useful result that facilitates
the subsequent comparative static results.
Lemma 5 :C o n d i t i o nC2 binds in a separating equilibrium.
T h em o d e r a t et y p e ’ so p t i m a lt a xp o l i c y ,tS
































subject to : t1
Lj 2 SLc = S1 \ S2
Denoting the Lagrangian multipliers on the conditions C1 and C2 by Â1 and Â2 re-
spectively, tS






























Lc)=0 , hence, the moderate type implements an even
13Figure 5.1: Separating Equilibrium: Left Party Incumbent
more moderate tax policy under asymmetric information i.e. tS
Lc <t ¤
Lc;t h ec a s eÂ2 =0is
explored in Example 1 below.
Lemma 6 : If dominated strategies are ruled out, then the unique solution to the mod-
erate type’s problem is tS
Lc =i n fSC
2 · t¤
Lc.
Figure 5.1 provides a diagrammatic illustration of the separating equilibrium
in the policy space, f®;tg. The respective indi¤erence curves of the moderate and the
extreme types corresponding to the full information outcome are shown as MM and EE,
the government budget constraint (® = t¹)i ss h o w na st h el i n eBB through the origin
and the respective MPTR’s are shown as t¤
Lc and t¤
Ll. The depiction of the sets S1 and S2
re‡ects the fact that individual payo¤s are decreasing in taxes that lie farther away from
ones MPTR; at the boundaries of the set SC
2 , the moderate type’s platform is su¢ciently
distant so as to give zero net bene…ts to the extreme type from misrepresenting her type.
The indi¤erence curve of the extreme type passing through f®;tS
Lcg is shown by E1E1;t h e
vertical distance G between EE and E1E1 is the current loss to the extreme type from
misrepresenting her type; in equilibrium it just equals the future gain (LHS of C2).
Given the posterior beliefs, the moderate type’s tax policy immediately reveals her type
to the voters, so there is no gain to the extreme type from distorting her tax policy relative
to her MPTR, t¤
Ll,h e n c etS
Ll = t¤








. In the second period, lame duck politicians simply
implement their MPTR.
When Â2 =0at tS
Lc = t¤
Lc, the solutions under asymmetric and full information coincide;
Example 1 below considers this possibility when the distribution of population is uniform.
Example 1 : Suppose that the population density is uniform over [0;1] and the Right
party politician is liberal. Condition C2, when evaluated at t1
Lc = t¤
Lc can be rewritten as:






14Figure 5.2: Separating Equilibrium: Right Party Incumbent
If 5.2 holds, then asymmetric information has no bite relative to full information. As
“political polarization”, t¤
Ll ¡t¤
Rl increases, the opportunity cost to the extreme type from
loosing the election increases while an increase in “ideological polarization”, ¢±,i n c r e a s e s
t¤
Ll¡t¤
Lc, thus imposing greater current losses on the extreme type from misrepresenting her
type. Thus, political polarization increases the incentive of the extreme type to mimic the
moderate type while ideological polarization reduces it. These comparative static e¤ects
are discussed more generally in subsection 5.3.
Furthermore, an increase in rents reduces the likelihood that condition 5.2 will hold,
because rents increase the incentive of the extreme type to hijack the moderate type’s
platform. Consider the numerical example: µ =2 , t¤
Ll ¡ t¤
Rl =0 :1 and ¢± =0 :2.I nt h i s
case condition 5.2 reduces to ÃLl · 0:1, hence, the solutions under asymmetric and full
information are identical if political rents do not exceed 20 percent of the average income
(¹ =0 :5), otherwise the two solutions are distinct.
5.1.1. First Period Incumbent belongs to the Right Party
Recalling that the moderate Right party politician is a “liberal” while the extreme
type is a “conservative”, Figure 5.2, which is analogous to Figure 5.1, summarizes the
equilibrium outcome and Lemma 7 states the formal result without proof. The proofs and
the notation are strictly analogous to the case of the Left party incumbent.





Rl while the extreme (conservative) type announces tS
Rc = t¤
Rc.
The only di¤erence from the case of the Left party incumbent is that the moderate
type in the Right party increases …rst period redistributive taxes relative to her MPTR.
155.2. Characteristics of the Separating Equilibrium
The relevant features of the separating equilibrium are analyzed below in four main sub-
sections. (1) Partial Convergence, and Director’s Law. (2) Inter-Term Tax Variability. (3)
Policy Reversals, and (4) Relation to Other Signaling Models.
5.2.1. Partial Convergence and Director’s Law
Partial convergence is a well known …nding in several political economy models of full-
information and full-commitment; for example Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983). Lem-




Lc, thus, in the …rst period, the
moderate types in each party distort their redistributive tax policy in the direction of even
greater moderation. In this sense, partial convergence in the redistributive tax policies of
the two parties takes place; see the lower arrows in Figure 5.3.
This paper explains partial convergence on account of two factors. First, depending on
the bargaining power and the location of the factions in each party, relatively centrist can-
didates might be chosen (see Figure 4.1). Second, the moderate types in each party move
towards the middle to signal their type, which has no counterpart in the full information
models. Furthermore, partial convergence is period and type contingent; it does not occur
in the case of lame-duck or extreme type politicians. Partial convergence towards the mid-
dle ground, tilts redistributive policy towards that preferred by middle income voters and
in this sense, a version of Director’s Law holds, but it too is period and type contingent.
This contrasts with the full-information and full-commitment literature, where Director’s
Law holds unconditionally; for example Dixit and Londregan (1998).
5.2.2. Inter-Term Tax Variability (Political Budget Cycles)
The extreme types in each party announce their MPTR in each period, while the moderate




Lc)i nt h e
…rst period, but as lame duck politicians in the second period, revert back to their MPTR.
The resulting pattern of inter-term variation in the redistributive tax rate (political budget
cycles) is shown in Figure 5.3. The pattern of political budget cycles is party-speci…c. It is
o p t i m a lf o rt h em o d e r a t et y p ei nt h eL e f tp a r t yt oh a v eas m a l l e rg o v e r n m e n ti nh e r… r s t
p e r i o di no ¢ c er e l a t i v et ot h es e c o n d ,w h i l et h ec o n v e r s ei st r u ef o rt h em o d e r a t et y p ei n
the Right party.
Besley and Case (1995) use a fairly comprehensive data set on gubernatorial elections
in 52 US states that had term limits, over the period 1950-1986. Their results show a
pattern of party-speci…c political budget cycles that is identical to the one predicted in
this paper, although the strength of the political budget cycle was stronger for Democrats
(Left party) relative to the Republicans (Right party). In an interesting study, Shi and
Svensson (2001) …nd that the magnitude of the political budget cycles depends on the
share of informed voters in the electorate. This is also consistent with the predictions of
this paper; there are no political budget cycles when voters have full information about
the politician while such cycles exist under asymmetric information about the politician.






Lc, there is no presumption that tS
Rl <t S
Lc. Indeed, if tS
Lc <t S
Rl
then a policy reversal takes place; “conservative Left party politicians” could appear even
more conservative than “liberal Right party politicians”. The comparative static results in
subsection 5.3 below show that policy reversals could arise due to a variety of reasons such
as an increase in political rents, and increased “political” and “ideological” polarization.
One is tempted to conjecture that in an appropriately modi…ed model, if politicians could
signal their ideological type through public debt, policy reversals might take the form of a
liberal Right party politician incurring relatively more debt as compared to a conservative
Left party politician; for an alternative explanation and theory see Persson and Svensson
(1989).
5.2.4. Relation to Other Signaling Models
In signaling models of government policy it is typical to assign the labels of distinct
political parties, Left or Right, to the two incarnations of the same politician; see for
instance the survey in Persson and Tabellini (1990). Notwithstanding this questionable
interpretation, this framework also does not allow for a meaningful distinction between the
candidate selection stage and the implementation of government policy. Furthermore, such
interpretation can sometimes lead to unexpected comparative static e¤ects. For instance,
within the redistributive framework of this paper, if there were only one politician with
two possible types, say, liberal and conservative, then separation would entail “policy
divergence” as the two types distance their policy away from the other in order to signal
their type to the voters. Such “policy divergence” seems counterfactual and contradicts the
evidence on the pattern of party-speci…c political budget cycles and on Director’s Law.
The preceding remarks also apply, at least to a degree, to the related paper by Rogo¤
(1990) whose focus is not on the central redistributive issues of this paper such as partial
convergence, party-speci…c political budget cycles and the e¤ect of inequality on the size
of the government. Furthermore, his assumption of homogenous voters and the absence of
political parties is perhaps less appropriate in a redistributive context.
175.3. Comparative Static Results
This subsection explores the comparative static e¤ects of political rents, beliefs, ideologi-
cal/ political polarization, and the salience parameter, while taking as given the candidates
selected by the two parties.
5.3.1. Political Rents
An increase in political rents, by increasing the bene…t of holding o¢ce, increases
the incentive of the extreme type to masquerade as a moderate type. The latter counters
this by announcing an even more moderate policy, that is too costly to mimic. Propo-
sition 3 below examines the resulting distortion in …rst period redistributive policy and
consequently in inter-term tax variability.
Proposition 3 :A ni n c r e a s ei nÃLl makes …rst period redistributive policy of the mod-
erate type even more moderate i.e. reduces tS
Lc, but leaves t¤
Lj unchanged for j = c;l.T h i s
increases inter-term tax variability, t¤
Lc ¡ tS
Lc.
Analogous results for a Right party incumbent are stated without proof in Corollary
1; recall that the moderate type in this case is a liberal politician.
Corollary 1 : If the …rst period incumbent belongs to the Right party, then an increase
in ÃRc increases tS
Rl, but leaves t¤




Under the assumptions of full-information and full-commitment, it has been shown
that more electoralist parties converge more; see for example Alesina and Rosenthal (1995:
27). A similar result also holds under the converse assumptions, because Proposition 3 and
Corollary 1 show that moderate politicians implement more centrist policies (greater con-
vergence) in response to an increase in electoral bene…ts. Furthermore, as the magnitude
of political rents increases, the moderate types might move in the direction of too much
moderation, leading to “policy reversals” among the two parties. The prediction about an
increase in the magnitude of political budget cycles following an increase in rents, is also
borne out by the empirical results in Shi and Svensson (2001).
5.3.2. Beliefs
An increase in ½, the prior probability of a voter being of liberal type increases, alters
the “swing voter support” for each of the types; this alters the probability of election (see
Lemma 2), as well as the di¤erential reelection probability (see equation 3.2). Di¤erenti-















The sign of @¢¦2
L=@½ depends on the the change in the relative “swing voter support”
for the two types. Since wl (t¤
Ll) <w l (t¤
Lc),i fF
00(x) > 0 (resp. F
00(x) < 0)i nt h ei n t e r v a l
18[wl (t¤
Ll);w l (t¤
Lc)],t h e n@¢¦2
L=@½ is positive (resp. negative). The resulting change in ¢¦2
L
alters the incentive of the extreme type to masquerade her type; Proposition 4 formalizes
the outcome.
Proposition 4 : Consider an increase in ½.I f F




Lc decreases and inter-term tax variability, t¤
Lc¡tS
Lc, increases. However, if F
00(:) < 0
in that interval, then tS
Lc increases and inter-term tax variability, t¤
Lc ¡ tS
Lc, decreases.
Proposition 4 shows that the e¤ect of beliefs (about the unknown redistributive
ideology of the voters) on redistribution depends on how the “swing voters” are distributed
in the population. Hence, societies in which there is a greater possibility of voters being
liberal, might actually exhibit less liberal redistribution (if F
00
< 0); a result that does not
arise under full information about the politician’s ideological type.
5.3.3. Polarization: Ideological and Political
Suppose that ideological polarization (¢± = ±l ¡ ±c) and political polarization (t¤
Lj ¡
t¤
Rk) increase respectively on account of a decrease in ±c and in t¤
Rk. The crucial e¤ect is on
the di¤erential probability of reelection. Implicitly di¤erentiate equation 3.2 with respect
to ¢± and t¤


















































The sign of the derivatives in 5.4 and 5.5 is completely determined by the shape of the
distribution function (sign of F
00(x)) in the domain of “swing voters” [wc;w l]. The intuition
is similar to the one in subsection 5.3.2 above, however, while ideological polarization (as
de…ned) only a¤ects the “swing voters” for the moderate type, “political polarization”
a¤ects “swing voters” for both types.
Ideological Polarization: The change in ¢¦2
L (see 5.4) following an increase in ide-
ological polarization, alters the incentive of the extreme type to misrepresent her type.
If the Right party opponent is a conservative, then the incentive of the extreme type to
masquerade her type increases through a second e¤ect . In that case, a fall in ±c reduces
t¤
Rc; the resulting increase in political polarization, t¤
Ll¡t¤
Rk, increases the opportunity cost
to the Left party extremist from loosing the elections. If the Right party politician is a
liberal, then the second e¤ect is absent. Proposition 5 formalizes the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5 : Following an increase in ¢±,i fF




Lc increases irrespective of the type of the Right party politician, but the a¤ect on
inter-term tax variability, t¤
Lc ¡tS
Lc, is ambiguous. If the Right party politician is a liberal
and F
00 < 0,t h e ntS
Lc decreases and inter-term tax variability increases.
19Political Polarization: The main primitives of political polarization are the relative
bargaining powers of the two factions in each party (see section 4.1), and there is some
evidence that political polarization in the British context, alluded to earlier, has been
falling. There are two e¤ects of political polarization. First, an increase in t¤
Ll ¡ t¤
Rk
increases the opportunity cost to the (wL;±l) politician of loosing the election, thereby
increasing her incentive to masquerade her type. The second e¤ect arises due to the change
in ¢¦2
L (see 5.5); if F
00(x) > 0 in the interval [wc;w l] then ¢¦2
L increases, complementing
the …rst e¤ect.
Proposition 6 :I fF
00
> 0 in the interval [wc (t¤
Ll);w l (t¤
Lc)] then an increase in political
polarization increases tS
Lc and dampens inter-term tax variability t¤
Lc¡ tS
Lc.
Under full-information, since politicians announce their MPTR, an increase in political
polarization polarizes tax policy to the same extent i.e. t¤
Lj ¡ t¤
Rk but there is no a¤ect
on political budget cycles. However, under asymmetric information, if F
00(x) > 0,t h e n
an increase in political polarization reduces (1) the degree of partial convergence (* tS
Lc
increases), (2) the strength of Director’s Law and, (3) the magnitude of political budget
cycles.
5.3.4. The Signi…cance of Societal Attitudes to Inequality
Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2000) argue that due to di¤erences in social mo-
bility between Europeans and Americans, the former prefer greater equality relative to the
latter. In very rough terms, this corresponds to a higher “salience parameter”, µ
¡1,f o r
the Europeans relative to the Americans. Without o¤ering any general results for redis-
tribution, Example 2 focusses on the special case of a uniform population distribution.
Example 2 : Suppose that the population is distributed uniformly over [0;1], ÃLl =0
and t¤
Rk = t¤
Rl. Using equation 3.2, ¢¦2





























@µ¡1 ¸ 0 is the empirically plausible condition that the wealth of the Left party







@µ¡1 > 0 and so inter-term tax variability dampens. Similar results hold for a
Right party incumbent. These …ndings are summarized and restated in Result 2 below.
Result 2 : For a uniform distribution, if ¹ · wL,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nµ
¡1 increases
equilibrium redistribution and dampens inter-term tax variability.
Under full-information, an increase in µ
¡1 always increases redistributive taxes if
¹ · wL. Example 2 replicates this result under asymmetric information, and so redistrib-
utive taxes in this simple example would be predicted to be higher in Europe relative to
the United States, however, political budget cycles are predicted to be more pronounced
in the latter.
205.4. Pooling Equilibrium
A separating equilibrium will not exist if the moderate type does not …nd it worthwhile
to prevent the extreme type from imitating her redistributive policy. In terms of the
notation introduced in section 5.1, this occurs when S1 ½ SC
2 . Denote the (identical)
tax policy chosen in a pooling equilibrium by both types in the Left party as tP
L and the




Since the moderate type is relatively popular as compared to the extreme type, it is easy
















are the reelection probabilities of a moderate and an extreme type respectively under a
separating equilibrium. The proof is analogous to that in Section 2.5, hence it is omitted.
De…nition 5 : In a pooling equilibrium, the di¤erential reelection probability is de…ned







Consistent with Bayes rule, on observing tP
L voters do not revise their posterior beliefs
i.e. ! =P r
¡
± = ±c j t = tP
L
¢
= ½ and zero otherwise. Conditions C3 and C4 below, are





















In conditions C3 and C4, the RHS is the current loss from participating in a pooling
equilibrium while the LHS is the expected future gain; in a successful pooling equilibrium,










Proposition 7 below shows that the pooling equilibrium can be ruled out if rents, ÃLl,
are appropriately bounded.
Proposition 7 :I f¡ · ÃLl then the pooling equilibrium survives the “intuitive criteria”.
But if ÃLl is bounded above by ¡ then the pooling equilibrium can be ruled out.
5.5. Some Extensions
5.5.1. Candidate Selection Under Asymmetric Information
In selecting the party candidate under asymmetric information, the factions in each party
must have common beliefs about: (1) the reelection probabilities of all types in each of
the following two periods, (2) the type of PBNE, separating or pooling, that is expected
to prevail in the …rst period, and (3) the distortion in redistributive policy relative to the
MPTR as a result of signaling. Although, the analysis of candidate selection is not as
elegant as under full information, results similar to those in Proposition 2 can be shown to
hold in this case as well12. In particular: (1) the selected candidate depends on the relative
bargaining powers of the two factions in the party, and (2) without further restrictions,
one cannot predict if a party chooses a more centrist candidate in response to a centrist
candidate chosen by the other party.
12Proofs available from the author on request.
215.5.2. Private Information About the Challenger
Introducing private information about the challenger does not alter the main character-
istics of the solution. Under asymmetric information about the Right party challenger,
the analysis goes through by rede…ning the critical voters wc and wl who constitute the
endpoints of the interval of swing voters. Instead of their MPTR being (t¤
Lj + t¤
R)=2,r e -






R]g where E [t¤
R]=½t¤
Rl +( 1¡ ½)t¤
Rc. This recalculation
only a¤ects the probability of reelection but nevertheless ¢¦2
L > 0 and ¢¦2
R > 0 continue
to hold. Hence, at the cost of greater complexity, one can still show that the results on
partial-convergence, Director’s Law and the pattern of political budget cycles are unaf-
fected. However, the comparative static results become more complicated and need to
take account of the e¤ect on the redistributive policy of the Right party challenger. While
this does not e¤ect the result on rents, the other comparative static results are somewhat
amended13. Candidate selection issues also become more complicated because voters and
the factions within parties now also need to guess the type of PBNE that will hold in the
Right party should it win the election.
6. INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION
At an empirical level, the relation between inequality and the size of the government is
mixed; see for instance the survey in Persson and Tabellini (2000). However, one basic
strand continues to run through the theoretical literature on this relationship, namely, that
redistributive policy is chosen in a median voter framework (MVF) under full-information;
for example Meltzer and Richard (1981), Persson and Tabellini (1994, 2000). In the MVF,
following changes to inequality, equilibrium redistributive policy changes as a result of
the spatial downward movement in the position of the median voter, who chooses a more
redistributive policy. Relative to the existing literature, the analysis in this section is con-
ducted in a representative democracy framework (RDF) under asymmetric-information.
Thus, the incentives and constraints faced by politicians play a central role. Since income
inequality can be a contentious concept, its usage in the paper is de…ned below.
De…nition 6 : An increase in inequality is de…ned as a mean preserving spread (MPS) in
the wealth distribution. Formally, it corresponds to an increase in the parameter ¾ in the
distribution function F(w;¾) from ¾1 to ¾2.
If the MPS takes place in some “localized interval” [wm;w n] such that its inter-
section with the interval of swing voters [wc;w l] is empty, then ¢¦2
L and the conditions
C1 and C2 are una¤ected and so there is no change in equilibrium redistribution. Thus,
in what follows, changes in income inequality will be “global changes” in the sense that
13It is not di¢cult to check that results do not change at all, if ideological polarization ¢± and beliefs
½ are party-speci…c.
22Figure 6.1: Income Inequality and Redistribution
[wc;w l] ½ [wm;w n]. Letting subscripts denote the partial derivatives of F(w;¾) and par-
tially di¤erentiating the expression for ¢¦2



















Denote the di¤erential probability of election conditional on ¾ by ¢¦2
L(¾).S i n c e
¾2 >¾ 1,a n dwl >w c, Result 3 below follows directly from equation 6.1.
Result 3 :¢¦2
L(¾2) ¡ ¢¦2
L(¾1) is positive (resp. negative) if 8w 2 [wc (t¤
Ll);w l (t¤
Lc)],
F12(w;¾) is positive (resp. negative).
The intuition is obvious from the de…nition of ¢¦2
Lj in equation 3.2. Following an
increase in inequality, if F1(w;¾) increases in the interval [wc;w l], then the moderate type







are common to both types and so cancel out, hence ¢¦2
Lj increases.
T h ec o n v e r s et a k e sp l a c ei fF1(w;¾) decreases. Figure 6.1 illustrates the various cases
following a MPS. In the interval [wc;w l] ½ (wa;w b), F12 < 0, thus, using Result 3 it follows
that ¢¦2
L(¾2) < ¢¦2
L(¾1) . Analogously, in the interval [wc;w l] ½ [wm;w n]=[wa;w b],
F12 > 0,t h u s ,¢¦2
L(¾2) > ¢¦2
L(¾1).
Proposition 8 :I f8w 2 [wc (t¤
Ll);w l (t¤
Lc)], F12(w;¾) is positive (resp. negative) then




Lc increases (resp. decreases).
23Using equation 3.4 it can be checked that Proposition 8 also holds if the …rst
period incumbent belongs to the Right party. Proposition 8 provides a simple condition
(F12(w;¾) > 0 in the domain of swing voters)f o rt h es i z eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n tt od e c r e a s ei n
response to an increase in income inequality. This contrasts with the typical result derived
in the MVF under full-information, namely, that inequality always increases the size of
the government. Furthermore, if changes in inequality were to a¤ect the representative
positions within the factions of militant and opportunist party members, then the candi-
date selection model would predict changes to the selected candidate in each party; this
remains an interesting issue for further research.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper reconsiders redistributive policy when voters and politicians have asymmetric
information about the redistributive preferences of each other, and the latter cannot make
credible commitments. The politicians are selected endogenously using a simple model
of candidate selection. The equilibrium redistributive outcome is in‡uenced by political
rents, political and ideological polarization, and the salience of the redistributive issue.
Some standard results in the full-information and the full-commitment literature con-
tinue to hold with quali…cations that are politician and period speci…c; these include partial
convergence and Director’s Law. However, other results such as policy reversals and inter-
term political budget cycles do not have a counterpart in the earlier literature. Finally,
the e¤ect of inequality on the size of the government depends crucially on the incentives
and constraints faced by politicians, unlike in the literature that directly appeals to the
median voter framework.
There are several possible directions for future research, some of which have partly
explored in the literature. These include, the roles of party reputations in sustaining
particular redistributive policies and the interaction of redistributive choice with other
policy variables. Although, the candidate selection model in this paper is fairly simple, it
illustrates the di¢culty in deriving general results. The selection of candidates in a general
redistributive context, especially in response to the changing distribution of income and
to social mobility remains a fascinating area for research.
8. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: In the second election, a (wi;±j) voter with MPTR t¤



















> 0.H e n c e , t h e
voting choice depends on the relative magnitudes of t¤
ij and (t¤
Lj + t¤
Rk)=2.D e n o t i n g b y
Vcc(t) and Vll(t), the respective utility functions of critical voters [wc;±c] and [wl;±l] (see




Rk).( 2 )F o ra l lv o t e r s
[wi;±j], j = c;l : wi <w c, Vij(t¤
Lj) >V ij(t¤
Rk).( 3 )F o ra l lv o t e r s[wi;±j], j = c;l : wi >w l,
Vij(t¤
Lj) <V ij(t¤
Rk).( 4 ) F o r a l l v o t e r s [wi;±l]:wi 2 [wc,wl], Vil(t¤
Lj) >V il(t¤
Rk).( 5 ) F o r
all voters [wi;±c]:wi 2 [wc,wl], Vic(t¤
Lj) <V ic(t¤
Rk). The derivation of these conditions
completes the proof. q
24Proof of Lemma 2:I nt h ei n t e r v a l[wc;w l], the (unknown) ideology of the voters, which
is decisive in their voting choice, follows a Bernoulli distribution ». With probability
0 · ½ · 1, the voter is liberal and votes Left (“success” denoted by ‘1’) and with probability
1 ¡ ½, the voter is conservative and votes Right (“failure” denoted by ‘0’). Formally,
» (y j ½)=½y (1 ¡ ½)
1¡y ;i f y =0 ; 1 and » (y j ½)=0otherwise.
The random variable Y de…ned as the number of successes in n independent repe-
titions (because ideological types are independent across voters) of the Bernoulli exper-





½y (1 ¡ ½)
1¡y ;i f y =0 ,
1 and B(y j n;½)=0otherwise. The mean and variance of this distribution are given
respectively by $ = n½ and ¾2 = n½(1 ¡ ½):
The proportion of voters who vote Left in the interval [wc;w l] equals the proportion
of liberal voters in this interval; this proportion is de…ned as limn!1 (Y=n) (b e c a u s et h e
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Therefore, the expected proportion of liberal voters in the interval [wc;w l] equals ½. Lemma









































and using equation 3.1,





































< 0. The signs of these
three derivatives complete the proof.q
Proof of Lemma 3: In the …rst election, a (wi;±j) voter votes for the Left party over



















Lj), or equivalently, if Vij(t¤
Lj) >V ij(t¤
Rk), which is identical to her voting decision
in the second election. Hence, the voting decisions and the election probabilities are
identical for all politicians in the two elections.q
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :The …rst step is to specify the set X of possible physical agree-
ments, with generic element tLj, on the “desired” redistributive tax rate; these simply
belong to the interval [0;1]. The disagreement outcome is t¤
Rk because if the two fac-
tions cannot agree, then the Right party candidate wins by default. De…ning < as the
set of real numbers, the player’s utility functions are E[WOj]:X[ft¤
Rkg!< ; and
E[WMj]:X[ft¤
Rkg!< .D e … n e ­ as the set of utility pairs obtained through agree-
ment, ­ = fE[WOj];E[WMj]:tLj 2 Xg. In order to derive the GNB solution, one needs
two technical conditions14; described as A1 and A2 below.
[A1] The Pareto frontier ­P of ­ is the graph of a concave function E[WMj]=
z(E[WOj]) whose domain is a closed interval I ½< and 9E[WOj] 2 I such that E[WOj] >
dO and z(E[WOj]) >d m.
14The relevant details and procedure follows Muthoo (1999) closely.
25[A2] The set ­W of weakly Pareto e¢cient utility pairs is closed.
By the de…nition of the MPTR and the properties of the utility function, it fol-
lows that in the intervals [0;t ¤
Oj),a n d(t¤
Mj;1] E[WOj] and E[WMj] are both respectively













is a closed interval, hence con-






. It is straightforward to check that condition A2 is
automatically satis…ed. Hence the feasible interval for the purposes of Generalized Nash


























0 which requires that ¦
00




















The sign follows because V
0
Mj(tLj) > 0 and V
0
Oj(tLj) < 0 when tLj 2 T. Implicitly































































Hence, the overall sign of the derivative is ambiguous. However, if ¸O ¡! 1 () ¸M ¡! 0,
then the second term disappears and the overall sign of the derivative is negative. q
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 : Suppose to the contrary that condition C2 does not bind at some t1
Lc
but does so at some t
0
6= t1
Lc. By de…nition, VLl(t
0) >V Ll(t1









.T h u s , VLc(t
0) >V Lc(t) which ensures that (a) the participation constraint
holds at t
0, and (2) the expected payo¤ of the moderate type increases. This contradicts
the original choice of t1
Lc.q
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 : The discussion following equation 5.1 has already shown that
tS
Lc · t¤
Lc. By de…nition, the extreme type cannot mimic any t 2 S2 and the payo¤ of the
moderate type VLc(t) is decreasing in jt ¡ t¤
Lcj,t h u stS
Lc =i n fSC
2 strictly dominates any
tS
Lc < inf SC
2 for the moderate type15.q
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : From equation 2.3, t¤
Lj is independent of ÃLj. Since condition C2








Lcg < 0.S i n c e
t¤
Lj is unchanged but tS
Lc decreases, thus, inter-term tax variability t¤
Lc ¡ tS
Lc increases.q
15If the extreme type chooses to mimick the moderate type when indi¤erent between mimicking and
not mimicking, then the solution is tS
Lc =i n fSC
2 ¡ ²,w h e r e²>0 is arbitrarily small.













The claim about tS
Lc now follows by using equation 5.3 while the claim on t¤
Lc ¡ tS
Lc
follows by noting that t¤
Lc is not a¤ected: q

















The claim about tS
Lc now follows by using equation 5.4 and by noting that @t¤
Rc=@(1=±c) <
0, while @t¤
Rl=@(1=±c)=0 . The a¤ect on inter-term tax variability, t¤
Lc ¡ tS
Lc, now follows
by noting that the fall in ±c decreases t¤
ic, i = L;R (using equation 2.3). q





























Rk ¸ 0. The claim about tS
Lc now follows
directly, while the claim on t¤
Lc ¡ tS
Lc follows because t¤
Lc is not a¤ected: q
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :Av e r yb r i e fs k e t c ho ft h ep r o o ff o l l o w s ;f o rm o r ed e t a i l ss e e
Cho-Kreps (1987). If ¡ · ÃLl, then the “intuitive criteria” does not rule out the pooling
equilibrium because S1 ½ SC
2 , hence there does not exist any tax policy in the complement
of the set S1 that “equilibrium dominates” those in the interior of the set S1 for a moderate
incumbent. However, if ÃLl · ¡, then the failure of condition C4 to hold rules out the
pooling equilibrium.q


















= ¡ sign of (@¢¦2
L=@¾). The proof now follows by using
Result 3 and noting that t¤
Lj does not change. q
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